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INTRODUCTION
Included in this Addendum are the fundamental documents
reflecting the decision of the Third District Court. Also
included are reproductions of the relevant Jury Instructions,
Special Verdict Form, and statutes, rules, and constitutional
provisions.

All references to statutes are to Utah Code Ann.,

1953, as amended.
All of the statutes reproduced are the versions in effect
during the time period of August, 1987 through January, 1988.
Some portions of the relevant statutes and constitutional provisions have been omitted for the convenience of the court as
irrelevant to the issues presented.
All of the printed material included in this Addendum has
been reproduced from the Utah Code Ann. published by the Michie
Company.
DATED this

11

day of September, 1992.
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C.

GREGORY CE//SANDERS, ESQ.
KIRK G. GIBBS, ESQ.
RONALD J. YENGICH, ESQ.
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
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Memorandum Decision of Third District Court

HUO DISTRICT GCUiT
Third Judicial Oittrict

DEC 0 9 m i
SALT

ITY

9y-

Deputy Cterk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

JOSEPH MITCHELL PARSONS,

CASE NO.

Plaintiff,

900901405

vs.
N. ELDON BARNES,
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came on for trial on the 24th of
May,

1991.

request

of

At the

conclusion

of the evidence

counsel, the matter

was

set

for

and

at the

final

closing

argument August 13, 1991.
At

trial,

the

plaintiff/petitioner

was

present

and

represented by his attorneys Gregory J. Sanders, and Ronald J.
Yengich,

Director

associated counsel.
Ms.

of

the

Rocky

Mountain

Defense

Fund

as

The State was represented by its counsel,

Charlene Barlow and Kirk M. Torgensen.

The parties having

submitted their respective pleadings and the Court now being
fully advised, makes this its:

00249
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MEMORANDUM DECISION
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL FACTS
1.

On March

8, 1990, the plaintiff, pro se, filed a

Complaint for habeas corpus relief,
2.

The Court set a pre-hearing conference for March 16,

1990, on which day the State filed its Answer.
3.

The

Court

then

discussed

appearing pro se the appointment

with

the

petitioner,

of counsel and the future

scheduling of proceedings, and stayed the execution date then
set for April 30, 1990.
4.

The Court appointed Messrs. Sanders and Yengich on May

2, 1990, and requested that they review the case and consider
filing an Amended Petition.

An Amended Petition was filed on

the 22nd of October, 1990.

(NOTE:

The Court wishes to note

here an expression of appreciation to each counsel

for the

petitioner, whose appearance and participation was pro bono.
This

effort

charitable

by

counsel

legal

work

represents
well

beyond

the

finest

that

evidence

which

might

of
be

expected.)
5.
on

This case was reviewed by the Utah State Supreme Court

direct

appeal

in the

case

of State v. Joseph Mitchell

00250
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Parsons, 781 P. 2d 1275, decided October 13, 1989.
rehearing was denied on January 22, 1990.
Court

Thereafter a

Before the Supreme

in the appeal, the petitioner was represented by his

defense attorney who assisted him in the trial and appeal of
the original case.
Petitioner has exhausted

his appellate

remedies and now

seeks relief through this Petition for Habeas Corpus.

STATEMENT OF FACTS RELATED TO THE OFFENSE
6.

Upon a plea of guilty, the defendant was convicted of

Murder in the First Degree, a Capital Offense, in violation of
Section

76-5-202

conducted

a

(1978,

sentencing

Supp.

1989).

proceeding

in

The

Court

harmony

thereafter

with

Section

76-3-207 (1978, Supp. 1989), and the jury unanimously concluded
the death penalty was appropriate and such was ordered by the
trial judge.
7.
August

The criminal
30,

1987.

offense occurred

The

defendant

had

Interstate 15 near Barstow, California.
Ernest, offered a ride to Mr. Parsons.

in late afternoon on
been

hitchhiking

on

The victim, Richard L.
Mr. Ernest agreed to

take the petitioner to Denver, Colorado.

00251
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At approximately

3:00

MEMORANDUM DECISION

a.m. on August 31, 1987, the

petitioner and Mr. Ernest drove into the Lunt Park rest area on
Interstate 15 near Cedar City.

Mr. Ernest stated he was too

tired to continue driving, and stopped for some sleep.

The

petitioner claims that Mr. Ernest made a homosexual advance, to
which the petitioner
requested

to

petitioner,

be

when

responded,

left
Mr.

"That's not my

alone.
Ernest

Again,

made

a

style,11 and

according

second

to

the

advance,

the

petitioner pulled from his sock a five inch double-edged knife
and stabbed Mr. Ernest in the chest, rendering multiple blows
which were fatal.
9.

The petitioner then drove Mr. Ernest's vehicle away

from the rest stop, pulled over on the shoulder of the highway,
and pushed Mr. Ernest's body out of the car covering it with a
sleeping bag.
10.

The petitioner then drove to Beaver, Utah, where he

changed his clothes, washed the victim's blood from himself and
from the inside of the vehicle, and emptied personal belongings
and

carpentry

tools

of

the

victim

into

a

dumpster.

He

thereafter assumed the victim's identity, purchasing food, gas,
etc. with Mr. Ernest's credit cards.

00252

11.
alerted

Law

enforcement

to

the
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credit

officers,
card

thereafter,

transactions

and

having
the

been

unusual

activities at the service station in Beaver, and later having
found the victim's body, were able at approximately 4:15 p.m.
on August 31, to apprehend the petitioner at a rest area on
Interstate 70.
12.
guilty

Thereafter,
to

Capital

as

stated

Homicide.

earlier,
The

the

penalty

defendant
portion

pled

of

the

proceedings ensued wherein the death penalty was ordered.

The

conviction and sentence were appealed and affirmed.
13.

This post-conviction petition was filed, raising the

following issues:

ISSUES HEREIN CONSIDERED
14.

The

petitioner

alleges

that

his

sentence

is

unconstitutional and in violation of the due process clause of
the

Fifth Amendment to the United

States Constitution, and

Articles I and VII of the Utah Constitution. He specifically
claims that the assistance of his trial and appellate counsel
was ineffective, justifying relief for the following alleged
deficiencies:

00253
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insufficient investigation

particularly

the

penalty

evidence

of the offense

to

mitigate

the

petitioner's conduct.
B.

Counsel erred in allowing his client to plead guilty

to Capital Homicide rather than directly trying the case.
C.

Counsel

erred

in

failing

to

prepare

expert

psychological witnesses for the defense in sentencing.
D.

Counsel

erred

in

failing

to

exclude

a

juror

who

communicated with a witness in the courthouse during a recess
of the proceedings.
E.

Counsel erred in failing to request of the court to

determine if certain jurors had an improper predisposition or
bias in regard to the death penalty.
F.

Prosecution

statements

or

erred

in

obtaining

"depositions" of witnesses

significant
without

sworn

notice to

opposing counsel and in violation of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
G.

Counsel erred in failing to file adequate discovery

motions.
H.

Counsel

erred

in

failing

to

advise

the

petitioner

regarding his rights at preliminary hearing.

00254
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Counsel erred in failing to meet with the petitioner

for a sufficient length of time to adequately prepare•
J.

Counsel erred in failing to adequately investigate or

request the Court inquire of the venire's awareness of media
reporting of the incidents.
K.

Counsel

erred

in

failing

to submit

an

appropriate

special verdict form.
L.

Counsel erred in failing to challenge the prosecutor

for failure to have filed an appropriate bond as required by
law.
M.
with

Prosecution
compensated

erred

in

counsel

failing
in

to provide

pursuing

his

petitioner
rights

to

post-conviction relief.
15.
Motion

Based upon the foregoing claims, the State filed a
for

Memoranda,

Partial
among

Summary
other

Judgment

things,

and

that

claimed
the

in

issues

its
for

post-conviction relief as stated above could not be considered
because

they

could

or

should

have

been

raised

on

appeal

consistent with Utah case law.
The Court will now address each of the respective claims.

00255
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PETITIONER'S CLAIMS COULD OR SHOULD HAVE BEEN
RAISED ON APPEAL
16.
(Utah

The Utah Supreme Court in Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029
1989),

sought only

stated

that

in "unusual

post-conviction

relief

circumstances" and

should

be

the majority

of

issues that could or should have been raised on appeal should
not

be

re-examined

in post-conviction

hearings.

See also,

Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 44 P.2d 968 (1968).
17.

While

it would be

easy to review the above-stated

issues as to whether they were available for consideration by
the Court at the time of appeal and then reject them in that
they

could

or

should

have

been

raised

at

that

time;

unfortunately, when the focus of the petitioner's claim

is

stated herein, is on the effectiveness of counsel, and since
that same counsel handled both the trial and appeal, it seems
appropriate

and

equitable

arguments on their merits.
claim

that the

that

this

Court

consider

those

Therefore, this Court rejects the

issues could

or should have been raised on

appeal, and reviews the issues, as follows:

00256
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SUFFICIENCY OF THE INVESTIGATION PRIOR TO TRIAL
The petitioner

claims

that

his

attorney

failed

to

adequately investigate the underlying offense through the use
of an authorized investigator and/or to seek adequate evidence
of mitigation for the penalty phase.
19.

Counsel

for the defendant

testified

several hundred hours working on the case.

that

he

spent

After a review of

the file and listening to the testimony of the witnesses, the
Court cannot find any basis upon which the Court could conclude
that

a

further

investigation

would

have

yielded

other

information that would have affected the result.
20.

The

petitioner

information,

including

has

further

information

failed

to

regarding

proffer
the

any

alleged

homosexual encounter or invitation which could cause the Court
to conclude that the result would be affected in the least.
21.

The Court will not and cannot conclude that further

investigation

would

proffered or alleged.

have

provided

something

now

not

even

To so conclude would cause courts to set

minimum time allocations for cases to be investigated.
would not be an acceptable standard.

00257
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22.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

COUNSEL ERRED IN ALLOWING HIS CLIENT TO PLEAD
GUILTY TO CAPITAL HOMICIDE

The petitioner has continually admitted that he was

responsible

for

killing

the

victim

in

this

case.

The

petitioner himself became frustrated during the course of the
preliminary hearing.

He apparently didn't want to hear the

evidence, and he requested strongly of his counsel that the
preliminary

hearing

terminate.

Petitioner

was

advised

that

that could not occur without the consent of the prosecution,
and that the prosecution would not consent without a clear,
unequivocal

plea

to

Capital

Homicide.

The

considered fully that decision, and determined

petitioner

to enter the

plea.
23.
plead

Not only does an accused individual have the right to
"not

"guilty."

guilty,"
That was

they

also

have

the

done in this case.

right

to

plead

As a part of the

legitimate trial strategy, the petitioner determined that it
would not be to his advantage to have the same jury consider
both the evidence related to guilt or innocence, and deliberate
thereon,

and

thereafter

consider

the

evidence

related

to

punishment with a view then toward aggravating and mitigating
circumstances and deliberate thereon.

That strategy is a very

00258
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legitimate

strategy

knowingly.

This Court finds no flaw therein.

C.

which

the

MEMORANDUM DECISION

petitioner

elected

to

make

COUNSEL ERRED IN FAILURE TO PREPARE PSYCHOLOGICAL
WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENSE

24.

No testimony was proffered as to the benefits of such

psychological witnesses, and this Court cannot speculate on the
result

of

standard

that

failure.

required

in

This

is particularly

Strickland

is

that

so when the

their

must

be

a

probability that the result would be in doubt if the error had
not occurred.

I cannot

find

any basis to

so conclude

or

speculate and decline to do so.

D. COUNSEL ERRED IN FAILURE TO EXCLUDE A JUROR
WHO COMMUNICATED WITH A WITNESS DURING A RECESS
25.

The

Court

finds that

the

conversation

between

the

juror and the witness, while unfortunate, was casual and the
parties were specifically asked whether they continued to raise
their objection or challenge to that juror.
his counsel declined to do so.

The petitioner and

The State in what was described

as "an abundance of caution" asked that the juror be replaced
with an alternate, which then the defendant refused.
certainly

could

not

be

held

A-12

to

having

a

The State

defect

00259
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conviction and sentence based upon such acquiescence by the
defendant.

E.
26.

CLAIMED JUROR RELIGIOUS PREDISPOSITION IN
FAVOR OF THE DEATH PENALTY

This

claim

was

abandoned

by

the

petitioner

and

counsel, and need not be further considered.

F.
27.

THE "DEPOSITIONS" TAKEN WITHOUT NOTICE TO
OPPOSING COUNSEL

On September 2, the day the Information was filed, and

only two days after the arrest of the petitioner, a sworn
statement was taken of the victim's wife, Ms. Beverly Ernest.
The statement was taken without notice to opposing counsel and
likely at a time when no counsel had, in fact, been named.
Later, on September 4, further sworn statements were taken of
prisoners in the Iron County Jail who had been cellmates with
the petitioner.
28.

While the statements were called

"depositions" when

they were taken, the prosecutor Mr. Scott Burns testified that
he did not consider the statements to be formal "depositions"
and that he had no intention of using the statements in trial.
This Court finds that these "depositions" were nothing more
than investigative sworn statements, and in fact worked to the

00260
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benefit of the petitioner during the course of the penalty
phase of the trial.

It was only the petitioner's counsel who

used the sworn statements in examining witnesses.
29.

The

statements

were

from

the

beginning

readily

available to defense counsel, and were only generated in order
to preserve investigative information.
30.
sworn

This Court can find no evidence that the taking of the

statements

witnesses.
of the

in any way

affected

the testimony

of the

There is no evidence that I can see from a review

record

that examination

as to the victim's

alleged

ownership of the gun, his general relationship with his wife,
and his having left California with cash failed to create in my
mind any issues that could have been preserved, enhanced or
utilized to benefit the petitioner or the State in any other
way

than

came

forth

at trial.

Had

the witness been more

closely cross-examined by vigorous defense counsel there would
have been no change.

Thus, I cannot find any factual basis to

conclude that there was any prejudice as a result of the taking
of the statement without notice to opposing counsel and the
petitioner.

I find that the statements were not "depositions",

but were rather "sworn statements" generated by a careful and
thoughtful investigative prosecutor.

M261
A-14
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COUNSEL FAILED TO FILE ADEQUATE DISCOVERY MOTIONS

31 • The Court finds this issue to be without merit, there
is no reason to file a discovery motion, other than out of an
abundance of caution when the motion would, as in this case,
yield nothing.

The prosecutor had a continual open file policy

and would often present the defense attorney with information
simultaneous to receipt of the same by the prosecutor.

On many

occasions each would review new information at the same time.
No information has been presented by the petitioner to show
that the discovery motions would have yielded anything.

To

find merit in the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on
that basis would cause the Court to

speculate well

beyond

appropriate circumstances.

H. COUNSEL FAILED TO ADVISE THE PETITIONER
REGARDING HIS RIGHTS FOR WAIVER OF PRELIMINARY HEARING
32.
advised
hearing.

The record reveals that the petitioner was adequately
of

the

It was

consequences
at

the

of

waiving

petitioner's

the

insistence

preliminary
that

the

hearing be discontinued and that he be allowed to plead guilty
to the killing.

The petitioner

A-15

in this court made a full
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admission to the killing, and has apparently never denied it.
The waiver of the preliminary hearing on that basis cannot be
found deficient.

The only issues at a preliminary hearing are

whether (1) there is probable cause to believe an offense has
been committed, and whether

(2) there

is probable cause to

believe the individual accused committed the offense.
those

issues were openly, willingly, and knowingly

Both of
admitted

throughout the proceedings.

I.
33.

COUNSEL FAILED TO MEET WITH THE PETITIONER FOR A
SUFFICIENT LENGTH OF TIME TO ADEQUATELY PREPARE
Without

a

predicate

showing

that

further

meetings

would have yielded information that could cause the Court to
doubt the quality of the representation and/or the conviction,
courts should not engage in speculation as to the amount of
time necessary for counsel and their clients to meet.

This

would require speculation beyond the purview of this Court, and
beyond that which is appropriate in this case.

J. COUNSEL FAILED TO ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE THE
VENIRE'S AWARENESS OF THE MEDIA REPORTING OF THE INCIDENT
34.

This offense happened in a relatively unpopulated part

of Utah, where it is natural to expect that many people would

00263
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have heard of the events•

There is, however, no evidence to

show that

into the media

further

inquiry

reporting

of the

events and the venire's knowledge of the same would affect the
result, thus this issue fails for want of sufficient evidence
in support.

K.

THE FAILURE TO COUNSEL TO SUBMIT AN APPROPRIATE
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

35.

The Special Verdict form utilized by the court has

been reviewed on appeal by the State Supreme Court and the
argument has been rejected.

I find no basis upon which to

infer that counsel was ineffective through

allowing without

further objection the same.
L. COUNSEL FAILED TO CHALLENGE THE PROSECUTOR
FOR FAILURE TO HAVING FILED THE REQUIRED BOND
36.

There is no basis upon which the Court should grant

relief for this issue.

The bonding of a county prosecutor is

principally

to provide

indemnity

public

the

in

event

of

of

some

inappropriate performance in office.

the

type

prosecutor
of

to

the

malfeasance

or

Since there is no right

to relief in this case on that basis, the Court finds the
petitioner fails for lack of standing to raise the issue.

A-17
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M. THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN PREJUDICED IN PURSUING
HIS POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DUE TO THE FAILURE TO
PROVIDE COSTS AND FEES
37.

Unfortunately,

determination.
superb.
prison

The

this

issue

petitioner's

remains

a

representation

legislative
herein

This Court has grave concerns that petitioners
seeking post-conviction

was
in

relief may not have adequate

access to counsel to raise issues that appropriately should be
carefully reviewed by a court.

Unfortunately, that assistance

is not provided at taxpayer's expense, and thus lawyers are
often constrained to accept the request of a judge to perform
pro

bono

services

post-conviction

as

cases.

was
This

done
is

here
an

in

significant

unfortunate

present

circumstance, but not a matter for judicial resolution.

Based upon the foregoing review and analysis of the issues
submitted by the petitioner in his Petition seeking a Writ of
Habeas Corpus, the Court finds that the same is and should be
denied.
Ms.

Barlow

and Mr.

Torgensen

are

requested

to

prepare

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an Order consistent

00265
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The Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

further orders that

in the event this

matter is not appealed within 30 days as allowed by law, that
the matter may be certified to the District Court for setting
of the execution date.
Dated this /^^

day of December, 1991.

DAVID S. JTOUNC
DISTRICT(COURT JUDGE

00266
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum
this

7

Decision,

to the

following,

day of December, 1991:

Gregory J. Sanders
Ronald J. Yengich
Attorneys for Petitioner
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Charlene Barlow
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JOSEPH MITCHELL PARSONS,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.
N. ELDON BARNES,
Respondent.

CASE NO. 900901405
Judge David S. Young

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
on May 24, 1991, and August 13, 1991, before the Honorable David
S. Young.

Petitioner, Joseph Mitchell Parsons, was present and

represented by Gregory J. Sanders and Ronald J. Yengich.
Respondent was represented by Charlene Barlow and Kirk Torgensen,
Assistant Attorneys General.

The Court being fully advised in

the premises hereby enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law as follows:
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That petitioner was hitchhiking on August 30, 1987,

on Interstate 15 near Barstow, California, when the victim,
Richard L. Ernest, offered him a ride to Denver, Colorado.
2.

That at approximately 3:00 a.m. on August 31, 1987,

Mr. Ernest stated that he was too tired to continue driving and
pulled into the Lunt Park rest area on Interstate 15 near Cedar
City, Utah.

Petitioner claims that Mr. Ernest made a homosexual

advance, to which the petitioner responded, "That's not my
style," and requested to be left alone. According to petitioner,
Mr. Ernest made another sexual advance.

In response, petitioner

pulled a five-inch, double-edged knife from his sock and stabbed
Mr. Ernest in the chest, administering multiple stab wounds which
were fatal.
3.

That petitioner drove Mr. Ernest's car away from

the rest stop, pulled over on the shoulder of the highway, pushed
Mr. Ernest's body out of the car, and covered it with a sleeping
bag.
4.

That petitioner drove to Beaver, Utah, where he

changed his clothes, washed the victim's blood from himself and
from the inside of the vehicle, and emptied Mr. Ernest's personal
belongings and carpentry tools into a dumpster.

Petitioner then
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assumed the victim's identity, purchasing food, lodging, gas,
etc., with Mr. Ernest's credit cards.
5.

That law enforcement officers became alerted to

petitioner's activities at the service station in Beaver and to
the credit card transactions.

They found Mr. Ernest's body, then

arrested petitioner at approximately 4:15 p.m. on August 31,
1987, at a rest area on Interstate 70.
6.

That petitioner was convicted of murder in the

first degree, a capital offense, upon a plea of guilty.
7.

That after a sentencing hearing, a jury unanimously

concluded that the death penalty was appropriate and such was
ordered by the trial judge.
8.

That petitioner's case was reviewed by the Utah

Supreme Court on direct appeal and was affirmed in State v.
Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989); a petition for rehearing was
denied on January 22, 1990.
9.

That on direct appeal, petitioner was represented

by his original trial counsel.
10.

That petitioner is currently incarcerated in the

Utah State Prison.
11.

That petitioner filed a pro se petition for

postconviction relief on March 8, 1990.
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12.

That the court appointed counsel for petitioner on

May 2, 1990.
13.

That counsel filed an amended petition on October

14.

That in that petition, petitioner alleges that his

22, 1990.

sentence is unconstitutional and violative of the due process
clause of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution
and articles I and VII of the Utah Constitution.
15.

That petitioner specifically claims that the

assistance of his trial and appellate counsel was ineffective,
based on the following alleged deficiencies:
A.

There was insufficient investigation of the offense

and particularly the penalty evidence to mitigate petitioner's
conduct.
B.

Counsel erred in allowing his client to plead

guilty to capital homicide rather than taking the case to trial.
C.

Counsel erred in failing to prepare expert

psychological witnesses for defense in sentencing.
D.

Counsel erred in failing to exclude a juror who

communicated with a witness in the courthouse during a recess of
the proceedings.
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E.

Counsel erred in failing to request of the court to

determine if certain jurors had an improper predisposition or
bias with regard to the death penalty.
F.

Prosecution erred in obtaining significant sworn

statements or "depositions" of witnesses without notice to
opposing counsel and in violation of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
G.

Counsel erred in failing to file adequate discovery

H.

Counsel erred in failing to advise the petitioner

motions.

regarding his rights at preliminary hearing.
I.

Counsel erred in failing to meet with the

petitioner for a sufficient length of time to adequately prepare.
J.

Counsel erred in failing to adequately investigate

or request the Court to inquire of the venire's awareness of
media reporting of the incident.
K.

Counsel erred in failing to submit an appropriate

special verdict form.
L.

Counsel erred in failing to challenge the

prosecutor for failing to file an bond as required by law.
M.

Prosecution erred in failing to provide petitioner

with compensated counsel in pursuing his rights to postconviction
relief.
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E.

Counsel erred in failing to request of the court to

determine if certain jurors had an improper predisposition or
bias with regard to the death penalty.
F.

Prosecution erred in obtaining significant sworn

statements or "depositions" of witnesses without notice to
opposing counsel and in violation of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
G.

Counsel erred in failing to file adequate discovery

H.

Counsel erred in failing to advise the petitioner

motions•

regarding his rights at preliminary hearing.
I.

Counsel erred in failing to meet with the

petitioner for a sufficient length of time to adequately prepare.
J.

Counsel erred in failing to adequately investigate

or request the Court to inquire of the venire's awareness of
media reporting of the incident.
K.

Counsel erred in failing to submit an appropriate

special verdict form.
L.

Counsel erred in failing to challenge the

prosecutor for failing to file an bond as required by law.
M.

Prosecution erred in failing to provide petitioner

with compensated counsel in pursuing his rights to postconviction
relief.
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16.

That in response to these claims, respondent filed

a motion for partial summary judgment and claimed, inter alia,
that the issues for postconviction relief as stated above could
not be considered because they could or should have been raised
on appeal consistent with Utah case law.
17.

That the fact that petitioner has focused upon

effectiveness of counsel and that the same counsel served
petitioner for both trial and appeal provides the "unusual
circumstance" to allow petitioner to raise these issues in a
postconviction proceeding.

Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029 (Utah

1989).
Taking petitioner's claims in order, the Court finds:
A.
18.

Sufficiency of the investigation prior to trial.
Trial counsel testified that he spent several

hundred hours working on the case.
19.

After reviewing the file and the testimony, the

Court cannot find any basis upon which to conclude that a further
investigation would have yielded other information which would
have affected the result of petitioner's case.
20.

Petitioner has failed to proffer any information,

including information regarding the alleged homosexual advance or
invitation which could cause the Court to conclude that the
result of this case would have been affected by further investigation.

-e-
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B.
21•

Counsel erred in allowing petitioner to plead
guilty to capital homicide,
Petitioner has continually admitted that he was

responsible for killing the victim.
22.

Petitioner became frustrated during the course of

the preliminary hearing because he did not want to hear the
evidence against him.
23.

Petitioner strongly requested of his counsel that

the preliminary hearing terminate; he was advised that that could
not occur without the consent of the prosecution and that the
prosecution would not consent without a clear, unequivocal plea
to capital homicide.
24.

Petitioner fully considered the options and

determined to enter the guilty plea.
25.

It was legitimate trial strategy to decide that it

was not to petitioner's advantage to have the same jury consider
both the evidence related to guilt or innocence, and deliberate
thereon, and then consider the evidence related to punishment and
deliberate thereon.
26.

Petitioner knowingly chose to plead guilty and

avoid having the jury consider the evidence to determine guilt or
innocence.

00275
-7-

C.
27.

Counsel erred in failing to prepare psychological
witnesses for the defense.
No testimony was proffered as to the benefits of

such psychological witnesses.
D.
28.

Counsel erred in failing to exclude a juror who
communicated with a witness during a recess.
The conversation between the juror and the

witness, while unfortunate, was casual.
29.

The parties were specifically asked by the court

whether they continued to raise objection to or challenge that
juror; petitioner, as well as his counsel, declined to do so.
30.

The State, in an abundance of caution, asked that

the juror be replaced with an alternate; however, defendant
rejected that request.
E.
31.

Claimed juror religious predisposition in favor
of the death penalty.
This claim was abandoned by petitioner and his

counsel at the evidentiary hearing.
F.
32.

The Hdepositions" taken without notice to defense
counsel.
On September 2, the day the information was filed,

and only two days after the arrest of petitioner, a sworn
statement was taken of the victim's wife, Ms. Beverly Ernest.
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33.

The statement was taken without notice to opposing

counsel and, in all likelihood, at a time when no counsel had
been appointed.
34.

On September 4, other sworn statements were taken.

35.

While the statements were called "depositions"

when they were taken, the prosecutor, Scott Burns, testified that
he did not consider the statements to be formal "depositions" and
that he had no intention of using the statements at trial.
36.

These "depositions" were nothing more than

investigative sworn statements, which, in fact, worked to
petitioner's benefit when petitioner used them during the course
of the penalty phase of the proceeding.

The statements were only

used by petitioner's counsel, not by the prosecution.
37.

The statements were available to defense counsel

from the beginning, and were generated only to preserve
investigative information.
38.

There is no evidence that the taking of the sworn

statements in any way affected the testimony of the witnesses.
39.

There is no evidence that examination as to the

victim's alleged ownership of a gun, his general relationship
with his wife, and his having left California with cash could
have preserved, enhanced, or utilized any issue which did not
already come forth in the proceedings.

00.?77

40.

Had the witnesses been closely cross-examined by

vigorous defense counsel during the taking of the statements
there would have been no different result.
41.

There was no prejudice to petitioner as a result

of the taking of the statements without notice to petitioner and
defense counsel.
G.
42.

Counsel failed to file adequate discovery motions,
There is no reason to file a discovery motion,

other than out of an abundance of caution, when the motion would,
as in this case, yield nothing new.
43.

The prosecutor had a continual open file policy

and would often present defense counsel with information
simultaneous to receipt of the same by the prosecutor.

On many

occasions both counsel would review new information at the same
time.
44.

Petitioner has presented no evidence to show that

formal discovery motions would have yielded anything more than
the open file policy yielded.
H.
45.

Counsel failed to advise petitioner regarding his
rights for waiver of preliminary hearing.
The record demonstrates that petitioner was

adequately advised of the consequences of waiving the preliminary
hearing.
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46.

It was at petitioner's insistence that the hearing

be discontinued and that he be allowed to plead guilty to the
homicide.
47.

At the evidentiary hearing in this matter,

petitioner again admitted to killing the victim.
48.

The only issues to be resolved at a preliminary

hearing are whether (1) there is probable cause to believe an
offense has been committed, and (2) there is probable cause to
believe the individual accused committed the offense; both of
these issues were openly, willingly, and knowingly admitted by
petitioner throughout the proceedings.
I,
49.

Counsel failed to meet with the petitioner for a
sufficient length of time to adequately prepare.
Petitioner has not shown that additional meetings

between petitioner and his trial counsel would have yielded
additional information; consequently, petitioner has failed to
raise doubts about the quality of the representation and/or the
conviction based on the time spent with trial counsel.
J.

50.

Counsel failed to adequately investigate the
venire's awareness of the media reporting of
the incident.
This offense occurred in a relatively unpopulated

part of Utah; consequently, it may be expected that many people
would have heard of the events.
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51.

Petitioner has presented no evidence to show that

further inquiry into the media reporting of the events and the
venire's knowledge of the same would have affected the result of
this case.
K.
52.

The failure of counsel to submit an appropriate
special verdict form.
The special verdict form used by the court in this

matter was reviewed on appeal by the Utah Supreme Court and
petitioner's argument was rejected; consequently, failure to
object to the verdict form did not make counsel ineffective.
L.
53.

Counsel failed to challenge the prosecutor for
failing to have filed a bond require by law.
The law requiring bonding of a county prosecutor

has been formulated principally to provide indemnity to the
public in the event of some type of malfeasance or inappropriate
performance in office by the prosecutor.
54.
M.

55.

Petitioner has no standing to raise this issue.
Petitioner has been prejudiced in pursuing his
postconviction relief due to the failure to
provide costs and fees.
This issue is a legislative decision, not one for

judicial resolution.
56.

Petitioner's representation herein was superb.

57.

This Court has grave concerns that petitioners

seeking postconviction relief may not have adequate access to

-i2-
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counsel to raise issues that appropriately should be carefully
reviewed by a court because counsel in postconviction proceedings
is not provided at taxpayers' expense.

The fact that lawyers are

often constrained to accept the request of a judge to perform pro
bono services in significant postconviction cases, as was done
here, is an unfortunate present circumstance; however, it is not
a matter for judicial resolution.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That, based upon the findings of fact, petitioner

did not have ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on
appeal.
2.

That this petition should be and is denied.

DATED this cffi^day of January, 1992.

APPROVED AS TO FORM;

Gregory J. Sanders

-13-
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was mailed,
postage prepaid, to Gregory J. Sanders, 175 East 400 South, Suite
330, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and Ronald J. Yengich, 175 East
400 South, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, Attorneys for
petitioner, this l/r

day of January, 1992.
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Order Denying Post-Conviction R e l i e f
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SALT LAKE
COUNTY
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PAUL VAN DAM ( 3 3 1 2 )

CtpuiyCurk

Attorney General
CHARLENE BARLOW (0212)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1021

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JOSEPH MITCHELL PARSONS,
Petitioner,

ORDER

v.
N. ELDON BARNES,

CASE NO. 900901405

Respondent.

Judge David S. Young

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
on May 24, 1991, and August 13, 1991, before the Honorable David
S. Young.

Petitioner, Joseph Mitchell Parsons, was present and

represented by Gregory J. Sanders and Ronald J. Yengich.
Respondent was represented by Charlene Barlow and Kirk Torgensen,
Assistant Attorneys General.

The Court having entered its

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing
therefore, it is hereby:
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ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows;
1.

That the petition for postconviction relief is

denied.
DATED this

7jfff%a^Tof January, 1992.

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Gregory J. Sanders

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Order was mailed, postage prepaid, to Gregory J.
Sanders, 175 East 400 South, Suite 330, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111, and Ronald J. Yengich, 175 East 400 South, Suite 400, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111, Attorneys for petitioner, this
of January, 1992.
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Special Verdict Questions and Form

FIFTH JuuiUiAl biSi Ct/UM

IRON COUNTY

FILED
J AN 2 91988
OnnxM&lftkdfau
%

SPECIAL VERDICT QUESTIONS
Prior to entering your verdict on one of the following
verdict forms, you are instructed to answer each and all of the
following Special Verdict Questions:
After duly considering the evidence and applying the law
as instructed, do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant/ Joseph Mitchell Parsons, intentionally or knowingly
caused the death of Richard L. Ernest while the said Joseph
Mitchell Parsons was engaged in the commission of, or an
attempt to commit/ or flight after committing or attempting to
commit Aggravated Robbery.
_

YES/ we so find unanimously,
NO/ we are unable to so find unanimously.

After duly considering the evidence and applying the
law as instructed/ do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant/ Joseph Mitchell Parsons, intentionally or knowingly
caused the death of Richard L. Ernest for pecuniary gain.
YES/ we so find unanimously.
NO, we are unable to so find unanimously.
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CLERK

After duly considering the evidence and applying the law as
instructed/ do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant,
Joseph Mitchell Parsons, being a person on parole, knowingly
possessed or had in his custody or under his control a firearm.
YES/ we so find unanimously.
NO, we are unable to so find unanimously.

DATED this j? tf day of January, 1988.

^vc^

T^L?;

ury Foreperson
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

VERDICT FORM NO. 1

Plaintiff,
vs.
JOSEPH MITCHELL PARSONS,

Criminal No. 1153

Defendant.

We the jury impaneled in the above case, unanimously
render a verdict imposing the sentence of death.
DATED this 2. ^

day of January, 1988, at Parowan,

Iron County, Utah.

<?-<?*• < ^ < ? ~

JURY FOREPERSON
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Jury Instruction 14

INSTRUCTION NO.

if

With respect to aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
the law of the State of Utah provides:
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
The defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the
death of Richard L. Ernest under any of the following circumstances:
1. While the said Joseph Mitchell Parsons was engaged
in the commission of or an attempt to commit, or flight after
committing or attempting to commit aggravated robbery and/or
2.

For pecuniary gain and/or

3. The said Joseph Mitchell Parsons had previously been
convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to
a person.
You may consider as aggravating circumstances

those

circumstances listed above.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
1. "The defendant has no significant history of prior
criminal activity."
2. "The murder was committed while the defendant was under
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance."
3.

"The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the

substantial domination of another person."
4.

"At the time of the murder, the capacity of the

defendant to appreciate the ciminality (wrongfulness) of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement of the law

9r^

was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease,
intoxication or influence of drugs."
5.

"The youth of the defendant at the time of the

6.

"Whether the defendant was an accomplice in the

crime."

murder committed by another person and his participation was
relatively minor.
7. "Any other fact in mitigation of the penalty."
The foregoing are direct quotations from the law.

In

stating them to you the Court does not intend to imply that any
of them are applicable to this case. Whether or not they are
applicable is for you to determine from all the evidence.

%s

ADDENDUM

"F"

Jury I n s t r u c t i o n s 15 and 15A

INSTRUCTION NO,

You are instructed that Aggravated Robbery is the unlawful
and intentional taking of personal property in the possession of
another from his person, or immediate presence, against his will,
accomplished

by means of force or fear, and in the course of

committing the robbery a person uses a firearm or a facsimile of
a firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife, or a deadly weapon.
You are instructed that "deadly weapon" means anything that
in the manner of its use or intended use is likely to cause death
or serious bodily injury.
You are instructed

that "pecuniary gain" is defined as a

monetary benefit or financial benefit.
You are instructed that a person is guilty of an attempt to
commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise
required for the commission of the offense, he engages in conduct
constituting a substantial step toward commission of the offense.
For purposes of this definition, conduct does not constitute a
substantial

step unless

it is strongly corroborative of the

actor's intent to commit the offense.
You are further instructed that no defense to the offense of
attempt

shall arise because the offense attempted was actually

committed,

or due

to factual or legal

impossibility

if the

offense could have been committed had the attendant circumstances
been as the actor believed them to be.
You are instructed that "flight" is defined as a fleeing.
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INSTRUCTION NO. /S~ A

You may also consider as aggravating circumstances
or mitigating circumstances any other evidence admitted at the
penalty phase of this trial relating to the nature and circumstances
of the crime, the defendant's character, background, mental or
physical condition, and any other facts in aggravation^provided
they relate to the nature and circumstances of the crime or the
individual characteristices of the defendant.
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ADDENDUM

"G"

Jury Instruction 18

INSTRUCTION NO.

13

I have previously instructed you that the State has the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the totality of
the aggravating circumstances outweighs the totality of the
mitigating circumstances in this case and that/ beyond a reasonable
doubt/ the imposition of the death penalty is justified and
appropriate in the circumstances of this case.

You must find that

the State has met its burden before you may impose the death
penalty in this case.
As an aggravating circumstance in addition to those upon
which I have previously instructed you/ the State has produced
evidence that the defendant/ Joseph Mitchell Parsons, committed
the crime of being a person on parole in possession of a firearm
in violation of the law of this State.

Before you may consider

evidence.that the defendant possessed a firearm before/ during or
after he admittedly caused the death of Richard L. Ernest/ you
must find beyond a reasonable doubt/ that each and every one of
the following elements has been proven by the evidence:
1.

That the offense, if any, occurred in the State of Utah/

2.

That the offense/ if any, occurred on or about August

31/ 1987/ although the exact date is immaterial/
3.

That the defendant/ Joseph Mitchell Parosn# was on

parole for a felony,
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4.

That the defendant, knowingly had in his possession or

under his custody or control,
5. A firearm.
You are instructed that the .38 caliber pistol located in
the glove compartment of the 1906 Dodge Omni is in fact a firearm.
If you find that each and every element stated has been
proven by the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
may consider the possession of the firearm by the defendant as
an aggravating circumstance.
If you find that one or more of these elements has not been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you may not consider the
presence of the firearm in the vehicle for any purpose and you
are hereby instructed, in that case, to ignore and disregard the
evidence presented regarding the firearm.
A special verdict question will be given so you can
state you findings on this question.

ADDENDUM

"H"

Jury Instruction 27

H-1

INSTRUCTION NO.

3H

When you retire to deliberate, you should appoint one of
your fellow jurors to act as foreperson, who will preside over
your deliberations and who will sign the verdict to which you
agree.

In this proceeding a unanimous concurrence of all jurors

is required before a verdict can be reached.

Your verdict must

be in writing and# when found by you, must be returned into
court.

Two verdict forms have been prepared for your consideration

together with three Special Verdict Questions, which will aid in
your deliberations, and which must be answered by unanimous finding
during your deliberations.

If the final vote of the jury members

is "No" or less than a unanimous "Yes" as to any Special Verdict
Question, then you may not consider the elements of that individual
question as aggravating circumstances.

Your foreperson will sign

the Special Verdict Questions and the verdict which correctly
reflects the result of your deliberations.
The following are the Special Verdict Questions which have
been prepared for you:
After duly considering the evidence and applying the law
as instructed, do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant, Joseph Mitchell Parsons, intentionally or knowingly
caused the death of Richard L. Ernest while the said Joseph
Mitchell Parsons was engaged in the commission of, or an attempt
to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit
Aggravated Robbery.
After duly considering the evidence and applying the law
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as instructed, do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant, Joseph Mitchell Parsons, intentionally or
knowingly caused the death of Richard L. Ernest for pecuniary
gain.
After duly considering the evidence and applying the law
as instructed, do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, Joseph Mitchell Parsons, being a person on parole,
knowingly possessed or had in his custody or under his control
a firearm.
The Verdict forms which will be furnished to you are as
follows:
We the jury, duly-empaneled in the above-entitled
case, unanimously render a verdict imposing the
sentence of death.
OR
We the jury, duly-empaneled in the above-entitled
case, unanimously render a verdict imposing the
sentence of life imprisonment.
Your foreperson will sign the appropriate Verdict form
urn both forms to the Court.
DATED this £(9 ~~ day of January, 1988.

Q>V<*~

PHILIP E^ES, DISTRICT JUDGE
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United States Constitution
Amendments VI, and XIV

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused*]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

AIZIZJENiyCJM

"J-"

Utah Constitution
Article I# Sections 1# 5, 7, and 12

ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS

Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to eryoy and defend their
lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against
wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right.

Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.]
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, in
case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it.

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

ADDENDUM

"K"

§76-5-201
§76-6-301
§76-6-302
§76-6-404

K-l

76-5-201. Criminal homicide — Elements — Designations
of offenses.
(1) A person commits criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly,
recklessly, with criminal negligence, or acting with a mental state otherwise
specified in the statute defining the offense, causes the death of another
human being, including an unborn child. There shall be no cause of action for
criminal homicide against a mother or a physician for the death of an unborn
child caused by an abortion where the abortion was permitted by law and the
required consent was lawfully given.
(2) Criminal homicide is murder in the first and second degree, manslaughter, negligent homicide, or automobile homicide.

76-6-301. Robbery.
(1) Robbery is the unlawful and intentional taking of personal property in
the possession of another from his person, or immediate presence, against his
will, accomplished by means of force or fear.
(2) Robbery is a felony of the second degree.

76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section
76-1-601; or
(b) causes serious bodily iiyury upon another.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the
course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during
the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission
of a robbery.

76-6-404. Theft — Elements.
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
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(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first degree if the actor
intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another under any of the following circumstances:
(a) The homicide was committed by a person who is confined in a jail or
other correctional institution.
(b) The homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme, course of
conduct, or criminal episode during which two or more persons are killed.
(c) The actor knowingly created a great risk of death to a person other
than the victim and the actor.
/
(d) The homicide was committed while the actor was engaged in the
commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or
attempting to commit, aggravated robbery, robbery, rape, rape of a child,
object rape, object rape of a child, forcible sodomy, sodomy upon a child,
sexual abuse of a child, child abuse of a child under the age of 14 years, as
otherwise defined in Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), or aggravated sexual assault, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated burglary, burglary, aggravated kidnaping, kidnaping, or child kidnaping.
(e) The homicide was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing an arrest of the defendant or another by a peace officer acting under
color of legal authority or for the purpose of effecting the defendant's or
another's escape from lawful custody.
(f) The homicide was committed for pecuniary or other personal gain.
(g) The defendant committed, or engaged or employed another person
to commit the homicide pursuant to an agreement or contract for remuneration or the promise of remuneration for commission of the homicide.
(h) The actor was previously convicted offirstor second degree murder
or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to a person. For the
purpose of this paragraph an offense committed in another jurisdiction,
which if committed in Utah would be punishable asfirstor second degree
murder, is deemed first or second degree murder.
(i) The homicide was committed for the purpose of: (i) preventing a
witnessfromtestifying; (ii) preventing a person from providing evidence
or participating in any legal proceedings or official investigation; (iii)
retaliating against a person for testifying, providing evidence, or participating in any legal proceedings or official investigation; or (iv) disrupting
or hindering any lawful governmental function or enforcement of laws.
(j) The victim is or has been a local, state, or federal public official, or a
candidate for public office, and the homicide is based on, is caused by, or is
related to that official position, act, capacity, or candidacy.
(k) The victim is or has been a peace officer, law enforcement officer,
executive officer, prosecuting officer, jailer, prison official, firefighter,
judge or other court official, juror, probation officer, or parole officer, and
the victim is either on duty or the homicide is based on, is caused by, or is
related to that official position, and the actor knew or reasonably should
have known that the victim holds or has held that official position.
(1) The homicide was committed by means of a destructive device,
bomb, explosive, infernal machine, or similar device which the actor
planted, hid, or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, building, or structure, or mailed or delivered, or caused to be planted, hidden, concealed,
mailed, or delivered and the actor knew or reasonably should have known
that his act or acts would create a great risk of death to human life.
(m) The homicide was committed during the act of unlawfully assuming control of any aircraft, train, or other public conveyance by use of
threats or force with intent to obtain any valuable consideration for the
release of the public conveyance or any passenger, crew member, or any
other person aboard, or to direct the route or movement of the public
conveyance or otherwise exert control over the public conveyance.
(n) The homicide was committed by means of the administration of a
poison or of any lethal substance or of any substance administered in a
lethal amount, dosage, or quantity.
(o) The victim was a person held or otherwise detained as a shield,
hostage, or for ransom.
(p) The actor was under a sentence of life imprisonment or a sentence
of death at the time of the commission of the homicide.
(q) The homicide was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious,
cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner, any of which must be demonstrated by physical torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the victim before death.
.1
2) Murder in the first degree is a capital offense.
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77-22-2. Right to subpoena witnesses and require production of evidence — Contents of subpoena — Interrogation before closed court
(1) In any matter involving the investigation of a crime, the existence of
a crime or malfeasance in office or anv criminal conspiracy or activity, the
attorney general or any county attorney shall have the right, upon application and approval of the district court, for good cause shown, to conduct
an investigation in which the prosecutor may subpoena witnesses, compel
their attendance and testimony under oath before any certified court
reporter, and require the production of books, papers, documents, recordings and any other items which constitute evidence or may be relevant to
the investigation in the judgment of the attorney general or county attorney.
(2) The subpoena need not disclose the names of possible defendants
and need only contain notification that the testimony of the witness is
sought in aid of criminal investigation and state the time and place of the
examination, which may be conducted anywhere within the jurisdication
of the prosecutor issuing the subpoena, and inform the party served that
he is entitled to be represented by counsel. Witness fees and expenses shall
be paid as in a civil action.
(3) The attorney general or any county attorney may make written
application to any district court and the court may order that interrogation
of any witness shall be held in secret; that such proceeding be secret; and
that the record of testimony be kept secret unless and until the court for
good cause otherwise orders. The court may order excluded from any investigative hearing or proceeding any persons except the attorneys representing the state and members of their staffs, the court reporter and the
attorney for the witness.
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77-35-7. Rule 7 — Proceedings before magistrate, (a) (1) When a
summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest, the defendant shall
appear before the court as directed in the summons.
(2) When any peace officer or other person shall make an arrest with
or without a warrant the person arrested shall be taken to a magistrate
pursuant to section 77-7-19. If a magistrate is not available in such circuit
or precinct, the person arrested shall be taken to the nearest available
magistrate for setting of bail. If an information has not been filed one shall
be filed without delay before the magistrate having jurisdiction over the
offense.
(3) If a person is arrested in a county other than where the offense was
committed he shall without unnecessary delay be returned to the county
wherein the crime was committed and shall be taken before the proper
magistrate as provided in these rules. If, for any reason, the person
arrested cannot be promptly returned to such county, he shall, without
unnecessary delay, be taken before a magistrate within the county of
arrest for the determination of bail and released thereon or other appropriate disposition. Bail, if taken, shall be returned forthwith to the proper
magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense together with the record
made of the proceedings before such magistrate.
(4) The magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense charged shall,
upon the defendant's first appearance before him, inform the defendant
(i) Of the charge in the information or indictment and furnish a copy
thereof to him;
(ii) Of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of the information and how he may obtain the same;
(iii) Of his right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the
court without expense to him if he is unable to obtain his own counsel;
(iv) Of his rights concerning bail or other circumstances umier which
he may obtain pre-trial release; and
(v) That he is not required to make any statement and that the statements he does make may be used against him in a court of law.
The magistrate shall thereupon allow the defendant reasonable time and
opportunity to consult counsel before proceeding further and shall allow
him to contact any attorney by any reasonable means without delay and
without fee.
(b) If the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor, the magistrate shall call upon the defendant to plead. If the defendant enters a plea
of guilty, he shall be sentenced by the magistrate as provided by law. If
the defendant enters a plea of not guilty, a trial date shall be set and it
may not be extended except for good cause shown. Trial shall be held in
accordance with these rules and law applicable to criminal cases.

(c) If a defendant is charged with a felony, he shall not be called on
to plead before the committing magistrate. During the initial appearance
before the magistrate, the defendant shall be advised of his right to a preliminary examination. If the defendant waives his right to a preliminary
examination, and the prosecuting attorney consents, the magistrate shall
forthwith order the defendant bound over to answer in the district court.
If the defendant does not waive a preliminary examination, the magistrate
shall schedule the preliminary examination. Such examination shall be
held within a reasonable time, but in any event not later than ten days
if the defendant is in custody for the offense charged and not later than
30 days if he is not in custody; provided, however, that these time periods
may be extended by the magistrate for good cause shown. A preliminary
examination shall not be held if the defendant is indicted.
(d) (1) A preliminary examination shall be held in accordance with the
rules and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The state
shall have the burden of proof and be required to proceed first with its
case. At the conclusion of the state's case, the defendant may testify under
oath, call witnesses, and present evidence. The defendant may also crossexamine the witnesses against him. If from the evidence a magistrate finds
probable cause to believe that the crime charged has been committed and
that the defendant has committed it, the magistrate shall forthwith order,
in writing, that the defendant be bound over to answer in the district
court. The findings of probable cause may be based on hearsay in whole
or in part. Objections to evidence on the ground that it was acquired by
unlawful means are not properly raised at the preliminary examination.
If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the crime
charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magistrate shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The
magistrate may enter findings of fact, conclusions of law and an order of
dismissal. The dismissal and discharge shall not preclude the state from
instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
(2) At a preliminary examination, the magistrate, upon request of
either party, may exclude witnesses from the courtroom and may require
witnesses not to converse with each other until the preliminary examination is concluded. On the request of either party the magistrate may order
all spectators to be excluded from the courtroom.
(3) If the magistrate orders the defendant bound over to the district
court, the magistrate shall execute in writing a bind-over order and shall
forthwith transmit to the clerk of the district court all pleadings in and
records made of the proceedings before tlie magistrate, including exhibits,
recordings and the typewritten transcript, if made, in the magistrate's
court.
(e) Whenever a magistrate commits a defendant to the custody of the
sheriff, the magistrate shall execute the appropriate commitment order.
(f) When a magistrate has good cause to believe that any material witness in a case pending before him will not appear and testify unless bond
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77-35-14. Rule 14 — Subpoena, (a) A subpoena to require the attendance of a witness or interpreter before a court, magistrate or grand jury,
in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution may be issued
by the magistrate with whom an information is filed, the county attorney
on his own initiative or upon the direction of the grand jury, or the court
in which an information or indictment is to be tried. The clerk of the court
in which a case is pending shall issue in blank to the defendant, without
charge, as many signed subpoenas as the defendant may require.
(b) A subpoena may command the person to whom it is directed to
appear and testify or to produce in court or to allow inspection of records,
papers or other objects. The court may quash or modify the subpoena if
compliance would be unreasonable.
(c) A subpoena may be served by any person over the age of 18 years
who is not a party. Service shall be made by delivering a copy of the subpoena to the witness or interpreter personally and notifying him of the
contents. A peace officer shall serve any subpoena delivered to him for service in his county.
(d) Written return of service of a subpoena shall be made promptly to
the court and to the person requesting that the subpoena be served, stating
the time and place of service and by whom service was made.
(e) A subpoena may compel the attendance of a witness from anywhere
in the state.
(f) When a person required as a witness is in custody within the state,
the court may order the officer having custody of the witness to bring him
before the court.
(g) Failure to obey a subpoena without reasonable excuse may be
deemed a contempt of the court responsible for its issuance.
(h) Whenever a material witness is about to leave the state, or is so
ill or infirm as to afford reasonable grounds for believing that he will be
unable to attend a trial or hearing, either party may, upon notice to the
other, apply to the court for an order that the witness be examined conditionally by deposition. Attendance of the witness at the deposition may be
compelled by subpoena. The defendant shall be present at the deposition
and the court shall make whatever order is necessary to effect such attendance.
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
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77-35-16. Rule 16 — Discovery, (a) Except as otherwise provided, the
prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon request the following material
or information of which he has knowledge:
(1) Relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or
co-defendants;
(2) The criminal record of the defendant;
(3) Physical evidence seized from the defendant or co-defendant;
(4) Evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of
the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of
the offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) Any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the
defendant to adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead.
The prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating
to alibi or insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in
order for the prosecutor to adequately prepare his case.
(d) Unless otherwise provided,-the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has
a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense
may make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and
information may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable
times and places.
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other
order as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit
the party to make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an
order granting relief following such an ex parte showing, the entire text
of the party's statement shall be sealed and preserved in the records of
the court to be made available to the appellate court in the event of an
appeal.
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought
to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this
rule, the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection,
grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not
disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the /!** day of September,
1992, four true and correct copies of the foregoing ADDENDUM TO
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT was mailed, postage prepaid, to the
following:
R. Paul Van Dam, Esq.
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Charlene Barlow, Esq.
Kirk M. Torgensen, Esq.
ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellee
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

PARSONS\BRIEF2.ADD

